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‘Some more reliable than others’:
Image management, donor
perceptions and the Global War
on Terror in East African
diplomacy*
JONATHAN FISHER
International Development Department, University of Birmingham,
Muirhead Tower, Edgbaston, Birmingham B TT, United Kingdom
Email: j.ﬁsher@bham.ac.uk
A B S T R A C T
This article explores the role of perceptions in donor-African relations and the
extent to which donor ‘images’ of African governments can be managed by
these same governments to their advantage. The article focuses on donor views
of ‘reliability’ in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and compares differing
international perceptions of Kenya and Uganda through this lens. Arguing that
donors have an exaggerated sense of Ugandan ‘compliance’ or reliability and
Kenyan unreliability in ﬁghting terrorism, it explains this by examining the two
governments’ international ‘image management’ strategies, or lack thereof.
The analysis contends that Uganda’s success at promoting itself as a major
donor ally in the GWOT, compared with Kenya’s general reluctance to do the
same, has played a signiﬁcant role in building and bolstering these differing
donor perceptions. This, the article suggests, raises important questions about
the nature of African agency in the international system.
* Earlier versions of this article were presented in  at the th European Conference on
African Studies, Uppsala and in  at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington DC. I wish to thank the organisers of and participants in these events together with
Professor David Anderson and Dr David Throup for their helpful and insightful feedback.
Research for this article has been funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (Award
numbers PTA---ES/F/ and PTA---). I am also grateful to the
University of Birmingham and to the University of Oxford for contributing to ﬁeldwork costs.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Since / and George W. Bush’s famous assertion that ‘either you are
with us, or you are with the terrorists’, being seen to be ‘joining’ the US
and other Western states in prosecuting the ‘Global War on Terror’
(GWOT) has become an important part of gaining or retaining Western
support for many developing states. A clear deﬁnition of what being
‘with us’ – or ‘compliance with the counter-terrorism regime’ as one
scholar has put it (Whitaker : ) – constitutes, however, does not
appear to formally exist in the academy or in the international
community. Consequently, there is considerable scope for interpret-
ation and misconception when aid donors consider how reliable a
government is in this regard. The imprecise manner in which
perceptions are constructed means that donors ultimately ‘select’
which events or actions by a foreign government they believe to be
most salient and ignore others in assessing whether or not it is ‘reliable’.
This can lead to stark differentiations being made which do not
necessarily stand up to scrutiny.
Donor perceptions of Ugandan and Kenyan involvement in the
GWOT are key examples of this process and its consequences.
Though both governments have arguably cooperated extensively
with donors in the GWOT, Kenya’s Mwai Kibaki administration
(in power since  though as part of a coalition since )
has consistently been seen as less reliable in this regard than
Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni/National Resistance Movement (NRM)
regime (in power since ). As a result, donors have treated the two
governments differently.
In explaining how these perceptions have come to be constructed,
however, it is important to recognise that ofﬁcial Western ‘knowledge’
about Africa is not inﬂuenced solely by donor personnel. African
governments themselves, as the article will demonstrate, can adopt a
variety of strategies to inﬂuence how donors view them and interpret
their actions. This article will argue that the Ugandan regime has been
extremely successful in using public and private diplomacy (‘image
management’) to persuade, primarily US, donor ofﬁcials to see it as a
key ally in the GWOT. The Kenyan government, however, has rarely
attempted to do this, to its disadvantage. Donor perceptions, therefore,
are understood to be partly a product of African image management –
whether well-executed or not. Such a contention has real implications
for scholarly understandings of the agency of ‘weak’ states in the
international system.
 J O N A T H A N F I S H E R
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C O O P E R A T I O N I N T H E W A R O N T E R R O R : ‘ C O M P L I A N C E ’ W I T H
T H E ‘ C O U N T E R - T E R R O R I S M R E G I M E ’ S I N C E  /  
Though the existence of a global counter-terrorism ‘regime’ has been
explored by scholars, questions remain on how to accurately assess state
‘compliance’ with such a regime. For scholars such as Stiles and
Thayne, strict emphasis is placed upon observance of UN Security
Council Resolution  by states and they consider a variety of
‘national characteristics’ including ‘domestic political culture, national
interests [and] regionalism’ in assessing what factors inﬂuence
compliance (: –). Whitaker suggests, however, that a
broader understanding of the concept, which includes more general
‘cooperation in the War on Terror’, is necessary (: –). When
used together, such methodologies can produce confusingly conﬂicting
results.
Among donors themselves compliance, or cooperation, criteria tend
to be discussed in an even more general manner. In the US State
Department publication Patterns of Global Terrorism, for example, the
‘global coalition’ against terrorism is stated to be ﬁghting the war on ﬁve
very broad fronts where there is considerable room for interpretational
ambiguity: ‘diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, ﬁnancial and
military’ (Department of State (DoS) : iii–xii). The purpose of this
article is not to suggest a possible resolution to this conceptual problem.
Its intention, rather, is to point out that such wide understandings of
‘cooperation’ among donors can have real consequences for govern-
ments of weak and aid-dependent states such as Uganda and Kenya.
As Dunn has noted, donors form perceptions of African, and other,
governments based on a ‘gradual layering and connecting of events and
meanings’. Importantly, however, there are few guarantees as to which
‘events will be selected’ in this process of ‘knowledge construction’ and,
indeed, which version of events will be deemed as most credible by
donor ofﬁcials (: –). When donors build perceptions of
African cooperation in the GWOT, therefore, there remains a likelihood
that they will privilege certain actions or policies over others in
constructing opinions of ‘reliability’. Thus donors can come to see
regimes such as those in Kenya and Uganda as quite different with
regard to their levels of cooperation when, in reality, the contrast is
perhaps less clear.
This article will analyse how these two African governments have, or
have not, played a role in inﬂuencing which issues donors ‘select’ in
building perceptions of their reliability in the GWOT. It will also, by way
I M A G E M A N A G E M E N T , D O N O R P E R C E P T I O N S
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of conclusion, consider why they have taken the approaches they have.
It is ﬁrst necessary, however, to outline how donor views partly conﬂict
with reality in this regard by summarising Ugandan and Kenyan
cooperation in the GWOT and donor responses therein.
C O M P A R I N G U G A N D A N A N D K E N Y A N C O O P E R A T I O N I N T H E G W O T
Terrorism in Uganda and Kenya
Both Uganda and Kenya have been the victims of terrorist attacks since
the s. In Uganda’s case, the primary terror threats have come from
domestic rebel groups with at-best tenuous links to global networks. The
most prominent of these have been the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a
millenarian organisation which carried out a sustained campaign of
violence in northern Uganda between  and , and the Allied
Democratic Forces (ADF), a mainly Muslim union of anti-Museveni
groups held responsible for a number of bombings in Kampala between
 and  (former Ugandan Cabinet Minister  int.). In July
, however,  people were killed in Kampala after al-Shabaab, a
Somali terrorist group, carried out suicide bombings in the city in
protest at Uganda’s involvement in an AU peacekeeping mission in
Mogadishu (AMISOM) (Dagne : ).
Terrorist attacks in Kenya have been more directly connected to al-
Qaeda. In  the group claimed responsibility for the bombing of the
US Embassy in Nairobi – its ﬁrst act of violence in Africa – which left over
 people dead and thousands wounded (Whitaker : –). The
organisation has continued to target Kenya since /. In , it
perpetrated two attacks: the ﬁrst involving the ﬁring of SAM-missiles at
a plane leaving Mombasa, the second the detonation of a truck bomb in
the lobby of a hotel north of the city. Though the missiles overshot their
target,  people were killed in the hotel bombing. Furthermore, in
 an al-Qaeda plot to bomb the US mission was foiled by Kenyan
authorities and in  ‘Kenya’s ﬁrst entirely domestic case of Muslim-
based terrorism’ occurred with the ﬁre-bombing of a Nairobi radio
station (Harmony Project : –).
Domestic cooperation
Both governments have cooperated extensively with donors in the
security sector during the s, actively participating in the US-funded
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, Safe Skies Initiative and Terrorist
Interdiction Program (Khadiagala : –; Whitaker : –).
 J O N A T H A N F I S H E R
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Both have established, with US support, Joint Anti-Terrorism Task
Forces (JATT) to coordinate domestic security services although Kenya
disbanded its version of this body in  (Muhula : –; Lind &
Howell : ). In addition, in , the US funded a National
Counter-Terrorism Centre in Nairobi which, according to some
commentators, ‘is rumoured to be under the direct operational
guidance of Washington’ (Lind & Howell : ). The UK has also
provided an annual counter-terrorism training package to Kenyan
security forces during the s and Kenyan Cabinet ministers
have personally attended UK-funded presentations on civilian defence
against SAM- missile attacks (Guardian ..; Hills : ;
former UK ofﬁcial  int.). Similarly, since  US State
Department personnel have worked directly with Kenyan ofﬁcials in
equipping and training coastal patrol units to improve security along the
country’s eastern coast (DoS a: ; Nairobi cable ..).
Furthermore, both Kampala and Nairobi have frequently allowed FBI
personnel to undertake counter-terrorism activities in their countries
and both state’s armies have held joint training exercises with their
US and UK counterparts since the early s (Heilman & Ndumbaro
: –; Harmony Project : ; Muhula : ; Guardian
..; Daily Monitor ..). Both African governments have
taken frequently strong measures in attempts to apprehend and arrest
suspected terrorists (Haynes : ; New Vision ..; New Vision
..; Prestholdt : –). Both have also targeted Muslim
communities speciﬁcally in these efforts: in , Nairobi carried out
arbitrary ‘police swoops on [domestic] Muslim communities’ in the
aftermath of the Mombasa hotel bombing while, in , also oversaw
the arrest of a number of terror suspects from among Somali refugees
ﬂeeing across the Kenyan border (Khadiagala : –; Harmony
Project : ; Lind & Howell : –; Whitaker : –).
Furthermore, since the mid s a considerable number of Kenyan
and Ugandan Islamic NGOs suspected of having links to extremist
groups have been forced to close down, sometimes, as Lind and Howell
note, ‘at the behest of foreign governments’ (Lind &Howell : –;
Naluswa : –).
While both governments hoped to pass anti-terrorism legislation
following post-/ US pressure, only in Uganda did such a bill pass.
In Kenya, the government was forced to withdraw its draconian
Suppression of Terrorism bill after a number of NGOs and a
parliamentary committee mounted a forceful campaign against it
(Lind & Howell : –). A second push by the Kibaki
I M A G E M A N A G E M E N T , D O N O R P E R C E P T I O N S
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administration to pass a re-drafted version of the bill in  was again
blocked and, as of , Kenya remains without a comprehensive anti-
terror law (Whitaker : ). This contrasts strongly with Uganda
where the  Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) was passed
‘quickly’ and without controversy (Mukwaya : –; Pinkney :
). Both governments are also, to some degree, equally ‘guilty’ of
non-compliance in other domestic areas. Both have been unable, for
example, to effectively coordinate their various security and other law
enforcement agencies for a variety of reasons including factionalism,
corruption and lack of capacity (Kampala cable ..; Nairobi
cable ..).
Regional cooperation
The Kenyan and Ugandan governments have also cooperated with
donors in the building of regional security frameworks. Most notably,
both have taken part in the US-funded Combined Joint Task Force–
Horn of Africa which aims, according to Muhula, ‘to detect, disrupt and
defeat transnational terrorist groups in the region’ (Muhula : ).
They have also both been involved, since , in the donor-funded East
African Counterterrorism Initiative (Davis : ). Indeed, in 
Kenya received nearly % of total funds from this initiative while ﬁve
other nations (including Uganda) shared the remainder (Prestholdt
: –).
Both governments have also been heavily involved in attempting to
resolve the ongoing crisis in Somalia, viewed as a ‘terrorist haven’ by
donors particularly after the short-lived June  takeover by the
Islamist Union of Islamic Courts (former White House ofﬁcial int.
November ). Since the Courts’ overthrow in December ,
an extremist off-shoot of the movement with alleged links to al-Qaeda
(al-Shabaab) has continued to operate in the region to the dismay of
Washington and to destabilise the Western-backed administration in
Mogadishu through carrying out terrorist attacks (BBC ..).
Prior to , both Kampala and Nairobi were deeply engaged in
regional processes aimed at restoring security to Somalia. Indeed,
throughout , Kenya facilitated the holding of elections for the
Somali Parliament and continues to play host to most aid agencies
dealing with Somalia (Inter-Press News ..; Reuters ..).
Since Somalia’s emergence in , however, as a central battleﬁeld in
the GWOT, Uganda has increasingly played a more prominent role.
Thus in February , with strong backing donors, it became
 J O N A T H A N F I S H E R
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the ﬁrst state to send troops to Somalia as part of AMISOM (Dagne
: ).
Kenya’s role has, until , been more private, however. Though it
did not involve itself in AMISOM until July , it has nevertheless
cooperated closely with Washington behind-the-scenes since the
mission’s inauguration (Davis : ; Daily Nation ..). Thus
a number of commentators noted in  how US and Kenyan troops
‘set up [joint] positions [along the Kenya–Somalia border] to capture
militants trying to ﬂee [Somalia]’ (New York Times ..). Kenyan
ofﬁcials reportedly detained over one hundred such refugees as part
of this operation and arranged for most to be transported to Addis
Ababa, via Mogadishu, as part of a US-backed instance of ‘extraordinary
rendition’ (Prestholdt : –). Furthermore, between  and
 the Kenyan government sought US approval (which it did not
receive) for its ‘Jubaland Initiative’ – a plan to use Kenyan-trained
Somali soldiers to create a ‘buffer zone inside Somalia to prevent
al-Shabaab inﬁltration and incursions’ into Kenya (Addis Ababa cable
..).
Nairobi’s involvement in Somalia changed dramatically in late ,
however, with the Kenyan army invading its neighbour in order to, as
internal security minister George Saitoti announced, ‘pursue the enemy,
who are the al-Shabaab, to wherever they will be, even in their country’
(BBC ..). This followed a spate of kidnappings of Western
tourists in northern Kenya which Nairobi held the terrorist group
responsible for (BBC ..). Though Nairobi did not consult with
donors prior to this intervention (Washington reportedly ‘found out
from the press’), its involvement has nevertheless been greeted with
‘very cautious optimism’ from some sections of the US government
(US government ofﬁcial  int.).
International cooperation
In the international sphere, however, the apparent contrast between
Ugandan and Kenyan cooperation with donors in the GWOT has been,
at times, more evident. In , for example, Kampala announced its
support for the US-led invasion of Iraq. This followed a Cabinet meeting
where, according to one minister, Museveni had, following the ‘ofﬁcial’
US line, stressed an apparent link between the Iraqi regime, al-Qaeda
and ADF bombings in Kampala in  while making his case for
supporting the war (former Uganda Cabinet Minister  int.). Kenya,
by contrast, refused to support the venture and a number of senior
I M A G E M A N A G E M E N T , D O N O R P E R C E P T I O N S
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ofﬁcials publicly criticised the legality of the invasion (Daily Nation
..). The two governments also took different stances on the
issue of signing Article  agreements with the US, insisted upon by
Washington from its allies to prevent US personnel abroad being
extradited to the International Criminal Court. As with Iraq, Uganda
supported the US in this regard, willingly signing an agreement in ,
while Kenya did not and pointedly emphasised its aversion to doing so
(Pinkney : ; Whitaker : ).
In other areas, however, Kenya has been far more cooperative
with international counter-terrorism priorities – in , for example,
Nairobi facilitated the extraordinary rendition of suspected terrorist
Mohamed Abdulmalik to US military base Guantanamo Bay at the
behest of Washington (Prestholdt : –). The Kenyan govern-
ment, along with the Ugandan, has also aligned itself closely with donor
governments in international policy-making on Somalia and Eritrea
(former White House ofﬁcial  int.; Fisher : –). In ,
for example, Kampala led efforts, with US and UK approval, at the UN to
impose sanctions on Asmara in  for its alleged support for Somali
Islamist militants (New Vision ..) while, in , Nairobi
spearheaded efforts to expand these measures (Daily Nation ..).
D O N O R R E S P O N S E S T O U G A N D A N A N D K E N Y A N C O O P E R A T I O N :
P E R C E P T I O N S O F R E L I A B I L I T Y A N D C O N S E Q U E N C E S
In many respects, therefore, Uganda and Kenya are in possession of
quite similar records of cooperation with donors over GWOT issues. In
general, however, the Museveni regime has been able to ‘deliver’ results
more comprehensively than the Kibaki government owing to the
former’s greater control of domestic legislative and security institutions
(see below). It is clear, however, that donors (particularly the US and
UK – the primary bilateral partners of both states) have drawn much
starker distinctions of the two governments’ reliability – perceiving
Kampala as consistently reliable but Nairobi as generally disinterested
and reluctant to engage. This contrast in donor perceptions can be
observed from both public and private sources as will be demonstrated
below.
Differing perceptions: public demonstrations
In public, senior donor ofﬁcials have consistently described the
Museveni regime as ‘a strong ally in the war on terror’ with one senior
 J O N A T H A N F I S H E R
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US Pentagon ofﬁcial in  thanking Kampala ‘for [its] support and
partnership’ in this endeavour. In his frequent visits to Washington,
Museveni has also often been personally lauded by senior policy-makers,
including the US president, for his government’s level of cooperation
(Bush ). Similar sentiments have rarely been expressed by donors
in relation to Kenya, however. Indeed, during Kibaki’s  visit to the
White House, Bush suggested that Kenya was still ‘ﬁnding what America
has [already] found’ in balancing the ‘challenges of freedom’ and that
it should resolve to be ‘persistent and courageous . . . in the ﬁght against
terror’ (Bush ). Furthermore, diplomats have been openly critical
of Kenya’s failure to pass counter-terrorism legislation (IOL News
..).
Likewise, donors have demonstrated their contrasting views of the two
governments’ commitment in the issuing of travel advisories. Following
the  Kenya attacks, for example, both the UK and US halted ﬂights
to the country and issued harsh travel advisories warning their citizens to
‘defer non-essential travel’ until further notice as a result of ‘terrorist
threats . . . aimed at Western targets’ which ‘the government of Kenya
might not be able to prevent’ (DoS a, b; East African
..). A high-proﬁle US presidential visit was also cancelled owing
to ‘worries about [the President’s] safety in Kenya’ (Daily Nation
..). In July , however, after terrorists attacked Kampala,
speciﬁcally targeting Western tourists, the US simply advised its
citizens in Uganda to ‘maintain a high level of vigilance and take
appropriate steps to increase their security awareness’ (BBC ..;
DoS b). Furthermore, less than a week after the bombings, the
US attorney-general visited the city, underscoring donors’ faith in the
Museveni regime’s competence regarding security (Daily Monitor
..).
Further evidence of differing donor perceptions can be found in the
contrasting proﬁles of Kenya and Uganda presented in ofﬁcial donor
publications, most notably the annual US Country Reports on Terrorism. In
these Uganda is consistently praised for its ‘ﬁrm stance against local and
international terrorism’ (DoS : ; DoS : ) and for its
‘efforts to track, capture and hold individuals with suspected links to
terrorist organizations’ (DoS : ; DoS a: ). Kenya, however,
is criticised for making ‘slow’ or ‘. . . no progress towards the overall
strengthening of its capabilities to combat terrorism’ (DoS : ;
DoS ; DoS b: ). It is also lambasted for failing to ‘engage in a
national discussion to sensitize the public to terrorism issues’ and for its
‘uneven’ cooperation as a ‘partner’ in the GWOT (DoS ).
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Differing perceptions: private demonstrations
The extent to which donors have genuinely internalised these narratives,
however, is most obvious from their undisclosed comments and actions.
A former UK ofﬁcial, for example, has privately described Kenya’s
approach to counter-terrorism in the early s as ‘pretty slow . . . and
uncertain’, conﬁding that the Kibaki administration was ‘pretty hard to
get interested’ in security matters with donors being forced to frequently
‘push hard for action’ (former UK ofﬁcial  int.). Another senior
donor ofﬁcial has, conversely, privately praised Kampala’s dedication
in the GWOT, arguing that ‘they’ve stepped up and done more than
anyone else [in the region]’ (Western diplomat  int.; USAID ;
New Vision ..). US ofﬁcials have privately criticised Nairobi for
being ‘behind the curve’ and slow to recognise the security threat posed
by Islamist groups in Somalia (former White House ofﬁcial  int.;
Addis Ababa cable ..) where they have long praised Kampala for
its regional ‘leadership’ and ‘alacrity’ in focusing on the issue (former
White House ofﬁcial  int.; former senior US government ofﬁcial
. int.).
Donor personnel have also disclosed in interviews their ‘deepening
mistrust’ of senior Kenyan security ofﬁcials (former UK ofﬁcial 
int.) whom they have characterised as preoccupied with corruption and
political intrigue (former senior US ofﬁcial . int.). This contrasts
strongly with the ‘exceptionally good relationship’ some donor ofﬁcials
have described between US and UK security ofﬁcials and their Ugandan
counterparts (former White House ofﬁcial  int.).
In their private bilateral engagements, donors have also shown that
they perceive Nairobi to be an unreliable partner. In , for example,
US and UK envoys led a joint demarche to the ofﬁce of Kenyan security
minister John Michuki where they raised ‘long-term concerns’ over
his government’s ‘problems with . . . counter-terrorism effectiveness’
(Nairobi cable ..). Similarly, the following month, the US
mission recommended that the US Secretary of State send a strongly
worded letter to her Kenyan counterpart attacking Nairobi’s ‘inadequa-
cies’ in ‘investigat [ing] and prosecut [ing] terrorism cases’ and insisting
that ‘more must be done’ (Nairobi cable ..). Diplomatic
demarches in Kampala, however, have invariably focused on democra-
tisation, rather than security, concerns while high-level US–Ugandan
correspondence has generally included extensive praise of the Museveni
regime for its commitment to opposing terrorism (former White House
ofﬁcial  int.).
 J O N A T H A N F I S H E R
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Oct 2014 IP address: 147.188.224.215
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of these contrasting donor
perceptions, however, can be found in US embassy cables leaked by
the Wikileaks organisation. A large number of cables sent by the US
Nairobi mission between  and , for example, emphasise the
Kibaki administration’s perceived ‘serious failure to confront terrorism’
(Nairobi cable ..), its ‘lackluster Counter-Terrorism perform-
ance’ (Nairobi cable ..) and its ‘lethargic’ (Nairobi cable
..), ‘slow’ (Nairobi cable ..) and, at times, ‘impossible’
(Nairobi cable ..) approach to responding to the terrorist
threat. At the heart of many of these embassy dispatches, indeed, there
appears to be a serious lack of trust of Kenya’s commitment to improving
its security. In late , for example, the US envoy privately dismissed
ofﬁcial Kenyan accounts of their ‘sterling [counter-terrorism] record’,
denouncing their ‘lack of political will’ (Nairobi cable ..) and,
in , bemoaned their ‘multiple and unfulﬁlled previous pledges’ in
this area (Nairobi cable ..). Nairobi’s dedication to ﬁghting
terrorism was again questioned by a subsequent US ambassador in ,
who argued that ‘terrorism does not ﬁgure at all as an issue of concern’
to Kenya’s political leadership or its people (Nairobi cable ..).
Such complaints do not seem to have been as prominent in cables sent
after  suggesting that US perceptions of Kenyan cooperation have
grown more positive in recent years.
Cables from Kampala, however, reveal a different picture. As in their
public pronouncements, donor ofﬁcials privately praised the Museveni
regime for ‘cooperating fully in the War on Terror’ and being ‘highly
receptive to US training and presence’ (Kampala cable ..).
Ugandan security ofﬁcials are also depicted as being far more
committed to ﬁghting terrorism – a  cable, for example, stressed
how ‘Ugandan ofﬁcials view their role in Somalia as long-term’
(Kampala cable ..). Likewise, a  cable which highlights
several areas for improvement in Uganda’s security structures never-
theless makes clear that ‘Uganda is responsive when terrorist threats are
identiﬁed’ (Kampala cable ..).
Differing perceptions and their consequences
It is apparent from a number of sources, therefore, that donors have
seen Uganda as substantially more reliable than Kenya in relation to the
GWOT. Critically, this dispensation has had real consequences for these
two African states. Between  and , for example, the US
suspended a number of its military assistance programmes in Kenya
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owing to a perceived lack of commitment in several security-related areas
(Nairobi cable ..) and, between  and , the US refused
to disburse US$million of aid as a result of Nairobi’s failure to sign an
Article  Agreement (Daily Nation ..; Whitaker : ).
Clearly these (relatively small) reductions had little practical impact on
the Kibaki administration’s ﬁnances although they clearly damaged
Kenya’s international reputation – as Kibaki allies bemoaned to the US
envoy in July  (Nairobi cable ..). It is also worth noting that
the US has been far more inclined to support ad hoc Ugandan regional
missions during the s than they have Kenyan missions against
Somali militants. Thus Washington reportedly provided considerable
assistance to Ugandan forces in pursuing the LRA during the mid
s (Branch : –) and, in , sent US military advisors
to further support Ugandan efforts (Reuters ..). Since ,
however, the US has consistently turned down Kenyan requests for
assistance against Somali militants in its proposed and actual military
interventions in that country (Addis Ababa cable ..; US ofﬁcial
 int.).
More signiﬁcantly, donors’ greater support for Uganda led to that
country being more favoured in overall aid disbursements than Kenya
after /. Until , for example, US aid to Uganda remained higher
than that to Kenya while Kenya only overtook Uganda in terms of total
donor aid in  (OECD various years). Kenya’s greater success in
attracting aid in the later s is perhaps further evidence of that
country’s gradual rehabilitation in the eyes of donors following its
involvement in Somalia (see above). Moreover, the UK has consistently
avoided directly supporting the Kibaki government with direct budget-
ary support owing to concerns over corruption, especially marked in the
security sector (Clay  int; ODI : ). By contrast, it has
enthusiastically bolstered the Museveni regime with the modality since
 in spite of clear evidence of high-level corruption in the Ugandan
security sector since the early s (Tangri & Mwenda : –;
: –).
The degree to which this disparity has signiﬁcantly damaged the
Kibaki government is, again, open to debate. That it has, nonetheless,
fared far worse in its receipt of donor assistance than might be expected
is particularly apparent when one considers that Kenya’s population is
substantially larger than Uganda’s. In addition, the US clearly views
Kenya as more central to ﬁghting the GWOT than Uganda (DoS :
) and Washington’s senior Africa diplomat has made clear that ‘no
country between Cairo and Capetown is more important [to the US]
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than Kenya’ (Nairobi cable ..). In this context, greater donor
support for Uganda than for Kenya is especially surprising.
The deleterious effects on Nairobi of these contrasting donor
perceptions, however, can be observed more obliquely. The cancellation
of George W. Bush’s planned  visit to Kenya on security grounds,
for example (see above) was not only humiliating for the recently
installed Kibaki administration but likely damaged the country’s image
in the eyes of US tourists and potential investors. One former US ofﬁcial
has noted that the cancellation led to ‘unfortunate policy messaging’
from Washington, particularly since Bush had been due to open the
new US mission in Nairobi as a symbol of US commitment to the
ongoing US–Kenyan relationship (former senior US ofﬁcial  int.).
Kenyan commentators at the time also feared that the apparent
withdrawal of US conﬁdence in the Kenyan administration’s compe-
tence would further deter the Bretton Woods institutions from resuming
their suspended lending programmes to the country (Daily Nation
..). The fact that Bush nevertheless travelled to neighbouring
Uganda represented a further embarrassment for Kibaki –Uganda had
been visited by Bush’s predecessor, Bill Clinton, only ﬁve years earlier.
The  travel advisory crisis (see above) which came about as a
result of continued US/UK doubts over Kenya’s perceived willingness
to face up to security challenges was nevertheless far more directly
damaging for the country. In , for example, the Kenya Tourist
Federation estimated that, as a result of the travel advisories, the
country’s tourism industry lost out on an estimated US$ million per
week for several months from Western visitors and it is clear that the
Kenyan economy took a long time to recover from this unexpected
shock (Standard ..; Barkan : ). The extent to which
Kenya was singled-out by donors for its apparent failings in this regard is
clear from the fact that this episode represented the ﬁrst time that
London had speciﬁcally instructed an airline (British Airways) not to ﬂy
to a particular country (Clay  int.).
Finally, the consequences of differing donor perceptions can also be
discerned in the more general double standards applied by Western
governments to Uganda and Kenya. High-level corruption, particularly
in the security sector, has been an on-going area of concern for major
donors in both countries but has elicited very different responses.
Thus while Kenyan ministers suspected of involvement in corruption
have been subjected to spirited public criticism by Western envoys
and increasingly strict international travel and visa restrictions, their
counterparts in Uganda have not (BBC News Online ..;
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Reuters ..). More generally, US and UK ofﬁcials have been far
more comfortable publicly criticising Nairobi than they have Kampala
(senior US ofﬁcial  int.).
Thus, between  and  several senior Ugandan ministers were
formally implicated in a number of high-proﬁle corruption scandals
with no formal response from Washington (Daily Monitor ..;
Tangri & Mwenda : –; Daily Monitor ..). In ,
however, the State Department did not hesitate to ban ﬁfteen senior
Kenyan ofﬁcials from entering the US in order to demonstrate
displeasure at Nairobi’s stalled ‘ﬁght against corruption’ (Dagne :
; Reuters .., ..). Most commentators agree that one of
the primary reasons that Uganda has avoided substantial donor censure
for these and other governance transgressions, in contrast to Kenya,
relates to its reputation as a central donor ally in the ﬁght against
terrorism (Heilman & Ndumbaro : –; Tangri & Mwenda
: ; DFID ofﬁcial  int.; Fisher : –).
Before concluding this section it is valuable to note that donor
governments are not monolithic and that donor perceptions are liable
to change and evolve over time. In the case of Kenya, for example, it is
important to acknowledge that donor perceptions have not been wholly
constant or static since /. Between c.  and , for example,
US ofﬁcials appear to have spoken more favourably about Nairobi’s
approach to security cooperation in embassy cables than previously,
perhaps owing to the greater importance of Somalia in donor regional
security policy or the growing prominence of other issues in donor–
Kenyan dialogue following the  election crisis (former White
House ofﬁcial  int.). It is also clear that throughout the s
US security and UK diplomatic personnel have held more critical
perspectives on Kenya than their diplomatic and international develop-
ment counterparts respectively. Thus the  Bush visit to Nairobi was
cancelled at the insistence of the US Secret Service to the protestations
of embassy ofﬁcials since the former held more negative assessments of
Kenya’s security capabilities (former senior US ofﬁcial . int.).
Likewise, State Department ofﬁcials serving in the mid-s have
described Kenyan security cooperation as ‘good’ (former senior US
ofﬁcial . int.) and ‘reliable’ (senior US ofﬁcial  int.) while
their security counterparts have instead spoken of it as ‘unreliable’,
‘reticent’ and ‘frustrating’ (former White House ofﬁcial  int.). In
the UK, ofﬁcials at the Department for International Development
(DFID) have sometimes pushed back against the more negative
assessments of Kenya being promulgated by their Foreign and
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Commonwealth Ofﬁce (FCO) colleagues in discussions on aid
modalities and disbursements in order to protect their development
portfolio in the country (Wrong : –). Exploring the dynamics
and consequences of these intra-donor divisions is not possible within
this study. It is nevertheless an important issue to acknowledge and
represents an area for future research.
T H E R O L E O F ‘ I M A G E M A N A G E M E N T ’
It is clear, therefore, that donors have ‘selected’ different aspects of the
two regimes’ behaviour in building perceptions of Ugandan and Kenyan
reliability. This has had advantageous consequences for Kampala but
not for Nairobi in spite of the relative similarities in their levels of
cooperation. The progression of this knowledge construction process,
however, could quite easily have resulted in different ‘images’ of
Ugandan and Kenyan reliability being formed in donor minds, thus
demonstrating the artiﬁciality and vulnerability of such narratives.
Instead, for example, of seeing Kampala’s two-decade long campaign
to defeat the LRA as evidence of a government ﬁrmly committed to
tackling terrorism, donors may alternatively have taken this as evidence
of a regime unable, or unwilling, to stiﬂe a small-scale, disorganised
insurrection enjoying limited local support.
Furthermore, rather than viewing Kenya’s failure to pass anti-terror
legislation as an example of Nairobi’s lack of commitment to ﬁghting
terrorism, donors might instead have seen it as representing a triumph
of democratisation. Indeed, as Whitaker notes, the US ‘supported and
provided training for the development’ of the same parliamentary
committee system which so successfully resisted executive pressure to
pass the  and  bills (Whitaker : , note )! Why, then,
was this ‘victory’ for Kenyan civil society and parliament over State
House not seen by donors, at least in part, as a cheering example of a
young democracy at work?
Understanding why such alternative ‘images’ have not been incor-
porated into donor perceptions, and why those casting Uganda as
‘reliable’ and Kenya as ‘unreliable’ have instead endured, is therefore a
salient question. This article contends that a major explanation can be
found in analysing the actions of the regimes themselves. For while
senior donor ofﬁcials may have limited personal contact with African
ofﬁcials themselves the sources of ‘knowledge’ which they consult in
forming perceptions of their governments are unlikely to be as isolated
from African inﬂuence. Media reports, NGO publications, diplomatic
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dispatches and encounters with public relations ﬁrms all have the
potential to be shaped or manipulated by savvy regime ofﬁcials keen on
presenting their government’s actions in a particular way. These kind of
‘image management’ strategies can equally backﬁre if they are not
implemented skilfully and competently.
As will be argued, Uganda has undertaken an extensive and well-
executed public and private diplomacy campaign since  to advance
its image among donors as a major ally in the GWOT while Kenya has
generally not. It has been Uganda’s successful use of ‘image manage-
ment’ (here conceptualised as a government’s use of private and public
diplomacy to inﬂuence another government’s view of it), therefore,
which has ensured that donors perceive it as more reliable than Kenya.
The remainder of the article will analyse how Kampala and Nairobi have,
or have not, attempted to manage their international image in relation
to the GWOT.
Ugandan strategies
The Museveni government has employed a number of strategies in
order to convince donors of its reliability in the GWOT. Shortly after the
/ attacks, for example, the Ugandan leader became the ﬁrst African
ruler to visit the World Trade Centre site, offering $, to the
victims of the tragedy (former US diplomat  int.). Kampala has also
augmented and developed its existing reputation among donors as a
regional opponent of Islamic terrorism in its post-/ policies towards
Eritrea and Somalia, a reputation earned during the s in its proxy
war against Khartoum. The most signiﬁcant and enduring strategy,
however, has been the regime’s use of domestic rebellions, primarily
those of the LRA and ADF, to successfully persuade donors that Uganda
is both a central player in the War and, most importantly, a committed
enemy of terrorism.
In the aftermath of /, this involved an international effort on the
regime’s part to present the rebel groups not simply as ‘rebels’ or
‘criminals’ but as ‘terrorists’ (Finnström : –; Atkinson 
int.). Thus prior to /, Museveni would usually speak of the LRA as
‘bandits’ or ‘ordinary lawbreakers’ in contexts where donors were
present (Doom & Vlassenroot : ; Channel  (UK) ; Dolan
: ; Atkinson : –). In a  interview with Canada TV,
however, Museveni described the victims of LRA atrocities as ‘victims of
Sudan-supported terrorism’ while in a  interview with a UN news
agency he characterised LRA activity as ‘terrorism’ (CTV ..;
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IRIN ..). The same rhetoric was used by the Ugandan leader in a
 speech to the US Council on Foreign Relations as it was in a 
open letter to media houses where the LRA were referred to as
‘terrorists’ on eleven occasions (Council on Foreign Relations ;
Daily Monitor ..).
In developing this narrative, the Ugandan government has been keen
to stress the linkages between these groups and the GWOT more
generally. Thus Museveni has often spoken in interviews with Western
journalists of ‘Uganda’s war on terror’ while his defence minister told
US media organisations in a  trip to Washington that ‘Uganda has
been a front-line state in the War on Terror for more than a
decade’ – both references to the LRA rebellion (CTV ..; PR
Newswire ..). Similarly, Rosa Whitaker, CEO of a Washington
lobbying ﬁrm retained by Kampala between  and , noted that
‘Uganda is ﬁghting its own war against terrorism’ in a  letter to
senior US ofﬁcial Walter Kansteiner. This letter also set out a ‘modest
request’ from Uganda for several million dollars worth of counter-
terrorism equipment, thereby directly linking the perceived terrorism
threat to the issue of donor military assistance (Whitaker Group :
–).
Kampala has also attempted to connect the rebel groups directly to
al-Qaeda. Thus in a  speech to policy-makers at the Council on
Foreign Relations, Museveni argued that both organisations ‘have been
trained by al-Qaeda and operated out of Sudan . . . since the s’
(Council on Foreign Relations ). He also noted in  that ‘bin
Laden . . . was the one who started arming . . . the ADF . . . our ﬁght is
directly linked to world terrorism’ while, only weeks after / itself,
told journalists that al-Qaeda, via the ADF, had plotted to assassinate him
in  and that ‘bin Laden took [the ADF] for terrorism training in
Afghanistan . . .’ (CTV ..; New Vision ..). Furthermore,
following Kampala’s lead in her  letter to Kansteiner, Whitaker
asserted, rather equivocally, that ‘I am told that the LRA . . . has
connections to Al-Queda [sic]’.
The extent to which these contentions have any basis in reality is open
to question: certainly there is evidence that ADF ﬁghters received
training from bin Laden’s terror network between  and 
(Haynes : ). The same cannot be said, however, for the
LRA – an organisation which, however it is to be understood, has no
credible association with Islamic jihadism. Indeed, one leading expert on
northern Uganda has argued that the only link between the two groups
that he has ever been aware of is a seminary in Juba where both groups
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were hosted, albeit not simultaneously, by the Sudanese government in
the s (Atkinson  int.). It is clear, therefore, that the Ugandan
regime’s attempts to connect the LRA to al-Qaeda have been a somewhat
disingenuous part of an international image management exercise.
Since the mid-s, Kampala has acted to ensure that its narrative on
the LRA/ADF ‘terror threat’ remains prominent in donor–Ugandan
dialogue. Ugandan policy-makers have therefore ‘pushed’ the subject to
the forefront of bilateral discussions with donors at every opportunity.
One former diplomat notes, for example, that during a mid-s
meeting with Museveni, the president constantly moved the conversa-
tion away from issues of democratic reform to that of the LRA threat,
clearly steering the discussion away from an area of disagreement to one
of supposed mutual concern (former Western diplomat  int.).
Likewise, a UK ofﬁcial has recorded how, at Kampala’s insistence,
the LRA became ‘really the only subject’ of importance debated at
UK–Ugandan meetings in the later s (FCO ofﬁcial  int.).
This technique has also been employed in encounters with Western
journalists. During a  interview with Associated Press, for example,
Museveni continually moved the line of questioning away from his
country’s controversial involvement in Congo and instead stressed the
link between ‘ﬁghters from the al-Qaida network’ and ‘rebel groups
in northern Uganda’; ultimately it was this narrative which came
to dominate the printed article and its headline (Associated Press
..).
The Ugandan regime also successfully lobbied for the inclusion of the
LRA and ADF on the State Department’s Terrorist Exclusion List in
 and the Ugandan vice president made clear to US ofﬁcials in
December that year that ‘We are very happy that these two have now
been listed . . . Uganda has been affected by terrorism for a very long
time but we have fought against [it]’ (IRIN ..; Perrot :
). Regime ofﬁcials have also continuously highlighted the rebel
groups’ inclusion on the list in speeches to US think tanks (Woodrow
Wilson Center ; Council on Foreign Relations ). In addition,
its security services have frequently made clear to Western journalists
that both organisations continue to pose a real threat to Uganda in
order to maintain the salience of this important narrative. Thus in ,
following the ADF’s removal from the List, Ugandan army spokesmen
emphasised that the ADF ‘was never annihilated and . . . [was] now re-
grouping’ and similar rhetoric has been employed by military ofﬁcials in
 (Sheikh ; Tripp : –; Reuters ..). Most
spectacularly, in , Uganda’s internal affairs minister announced,
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without providing evidence, that the ADF (‘a terrorist group linked to
al-Qaeda’) had planned to launch an attack during the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Kampala but
had been ‘neutralised’ by the security forces before they could do so
(Daily Telegraph .., ..).
That donors have been strongly inﬂuenced by these image manage-
ment strategies is clear. Not only have US politicians frequently referred
to ‘home-grown terrorism’ in their comments on Uganda, so also have
annual State Department Country Reports on Terrorism largely focused on
the LRA/ADF insurgencies when proﬁling Uganda (DoS : ; DoS
: ; Towns ; DoS b: ; DoS ; DoS : ; DoS
: ; DoS a: ). What is signiﬁcant, however, is the emphasis
placed herein on Kampala’s ‘successful operations against’ these groups.
Indeed, at the heart of Uganda’s GWOT narrative, and what
differentiates it so substantially from Kenya’s, is the degree to which it
has described the ﬁght against domestic terrorism as a ‘war’ which it is
engaged in and is winning.
Thus throughout the s, the Museveni government has repeatedly
suggested to donors that its campaign against the LRA has come close to
securing the rebel group’s military defeat. In the early s, Museveni
gave a senior US policy-maker the impression that the rebel group were
‘on the ropes’ and that very little was required to ‘ﬁnish them off’
(former senior US ofﬁcial . int.). This was also how he depicted
the situation to the ofﬁcial’s UK counterpart who recalls being told
frequently by Museveni that the conﬂict ‘would be over by the rainy
season’ (former senior FCO ofﬁcial . int.). Indeed, on several
occasions in the later s, Museveni claimed in front of Western
audiences that ‘we have actually ended that conﬂict’ and that ‘we have
defeated these terrorists . . .’ (Council on Foreign Relations ;
Al-Jazeera English ..). These assertions have, again, all been
disingenuous. The point, however, is that most donors have rarely
questioned Museveni’s commitment to dealing with the insurgency and
this has had a major effect on how they view his regime’s role in the
GWOT.
Kenyan strategies
By contrast, the Kenyan government has made minimal effort to manage
how its donors perceive it in relation to the GWOT. Kenyan ministers
have been far more reluctant to speak to Western journalists or at
Western think tanks in general and those who have have generally
I M A G E M A N A G E M E N T , D O N O R P E R C E P T I O N S
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Oct 2014 IP address: 147.188.224.215
avoided the issue of terrorism (BBC ··; Brookings Institution
). During his  US visit, for example, Kibaki was criticised by
Kenyan journalists for being ‘unwilling to engage with the [inter-
national] media except in the most scripted and perfunctory manner’
and the Kenyan leader has, at other times, demonstrated a similar
lack of interest in establishing a dialogue with this community (East
African ..; Daily Nation ..; Biden ). Successive
security ministers have also refused to make themselves available for
interview on trips to Washington (Standard ..; Daily Nation
..).
In private, the Kenyan government, unlike the Ugandan, has largely
refrained from trying to promote any narrative on its reliability in the
GWOT to donors and has largely engaged simply in defensive acts of
‘ﬁre-ﬁghting’. Between  and , for example, Nairobi retained
only one US lobbying ﬁrm (Uganda hired three during the same
period): Baraka Services. This ﬁrm’s remit was extremely limited and
non-strategic in its approach. Thus rather than attempting to more
broadly convince US policy-makers of Kenya’s importance in the GWOT
(as Scribe Strategies, another lobbying ﬁrm, had been hired by Kampala
to do in ), the ﬁrm was asked simply to ‘negotiate with [US] ofﬁcials
[on] how to fulﬁl the conditions and lift the [ travel] ban’ (Baraka
Services : ; Scribe Strategies : ). Prestholdt draws attention
to another episode of defensive Kenyan diplomacy from  where a
suspected terrorist, an imam, was arrested following a violent interven-
tion by police in response to US criticisms of Nairobi’s slow approach to
counter-terrorism (Prestholdt : –). Though welcomed in
Washington, this action again showed Kenya to be reactive rather than
proactive in its ﬁght against Islamic terrorism.
Moreover, Kenyan ofﬁcials have not attempted to use meetings with
donor ofﬁcials as opportunities to manage how their government is
seen. One former diplomat, for example, has described the Kenyan
leader’s demeanour in such encounters as ‘comatose’, noting that
Kibaki would often ‘fall asleep’ and leave his minor aides to deal with the
discussion (former senior FCO ofﬁcial . int.). Consequently there
has been no central ‘presiding genius’ of Kenyan image management
policy and junior ministers, some of whom have been seen by donors as
‘more capable than others’ (former senior US ofﬁcial . int.), have
always been on the defensive when dealing with Western ofﬁcials
(former UK ofﬁcial int March ; Nairobi cable ..). In ,
for example, Kenya’s internal security minister was reportedly ‘asked’
by Washington to travel to the US to ‘inform US ofﬁcials on
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steps . . . [Kenya] . . . had taken to combat insecurity’ (Daily Nation
..). According to one former donor ofﬁcial, ‘a few of the better
ministers got on with it [engaging with the donor community], but not
always in a very coordinated manner . . . Kibaki was all over the place.’
(former UK ofﬁcial  int.).
Nairobi’s inadvertent depiction of itself as an administration needing
to be ‘led to water’ on counter-terror issues has been compounded by
other factors. Firstly, in his rare moments of engaging with donor
ofﬁcials, Kibaki has consistently presented his government as submissive,
uninformed and a ‘follower’ in the GWOT. In , for example, he
told the US ambassador that ‘his government knew . . . little about real
political conditions in Somalia’ and US ofﬁcials have subsequently
expressed concern over Kenya’s limited understanding of Somali
political dynamics (Nairobi cable ..; US ofﬁcial  int.).
Museveni, by contrast, has convincingly presented himself as a leading
expert on the country’s problems in meetings with donor counterparts –
‘brieﬁng’ the UK premier on the topic in  (State House, Entebbe
) – and this has led to his being complemented by the US president
for his ‘good advice and . . . judgment when it comes to . . . Somalia
(Bush ).
Furthermore, in , Kibaki meekly appealed to the visiting US vice
president to ‘provide leadership to forge a concerted international
effort to stabilise Somalia’ (Biden ). The deferential nature of this
latter request did little to reassure donors of Nairobi’s reliability as a
possible major player in securing the country against terrorists and only
served to conﬁrm prejudices developed in Washington after Kenyan
troops pledged to AMISOM in , unlike those from Uganda, ‘failed
to materialise’ (former senior US ofﬁcial . int.). Interestingly,
Museveni himself appears to have encouraged US ofﬁcials to draw such
unfavourable comparisons in a  conversation with the US envoy to
the African Union (Daily Monitor ..).
Secondly, in its dealings with donor governments, Nairobi has
demonstrated a surprising degree of incompetence which has also had
an effect on donor perceptions. Thus, during the crisis over travel
advisories, Kibaki failed to ﬁll top diplomatic posts in both London and
Washington, leaving no senior ofﬁcial in either city to argue Nairobi’s
case (Standard ..). According to one European diplomat,
this led to donors becoming ‘rapidly disillusioned’ with the Kibaki
administration and concerned about its diplomatic capabilities (former
FCO ofﬁcial  int.). In addition, the Kenyan delegation travelling to
Washington in  lobbied the wrong section of the State Department
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in their failed attempt to secure the lifting of the travel ban (Daily Nation
..).
Donor ofﬁcials have recalled multiple occasions when Kibaki and his
team have missed signiﬁcant appointments with key Western personnel
including ambassadors and ministers (Clay  int.; Nairobi cable
..). Nairobi has compounded its reputation for unreliability
engendered through these actions by frequently breaking pledges made
to donors concerning speciﬁc counter-terrorism commitments. In ,
for example, Kenya’s foreign minister assured Washington that there
was no doubt a second anti-terror bill would pass (it did not) while
Kibaki told the US envoy that he would press for movement on the
development of the stalled JATT but subsequently failed to do so
(Nairobi cable ..; ..). Nairobi’s confused approach to
counter-terrorism was again demonstrated in early  when the
Kenyan delegation to IGAD and the Kenyan foreign ministry appeared
to present conﬂicting information on the country’s willingness to supply
troops to the AU mission in Somalia (Nairobi cable ..). Such
mistakes have rarely been made by Uganda in its relations with donors.
Indeed, Kampala’s US ambassador between  and , Edith
Ssempala, has been widely praised by donors for ‘knowing her way
around’ the bureaucracies of Washington (former senior US ofﬁcial
. int.).
Nairobi’s responses to US criticisms and counter-terrorism policies
have also often come across as petulant or even antagonistic and this has
led to the further strengthening of existing donor perceptions on the
Kibaki government’s unreliability. In , for example, the Kenyan
foreign minister put forward two veiled criticisms of donors at the UN in
relation to the travel ban and the War on Iraq and repeated the former
in a number of media interviews in London to the chagrin of UK
ofﬁcials (Daily Nation ..; former UK ofﬁcial  int.). In the
same year, one minister afﬁrmed that Nairobi would not necessarily ‘give
in to [donor] demands’ on tackling terrorism while another attacked
the travel bans as a ‘gross injustice’ (Daily Nation ..; Standard
..).
A former UK envoy notes that he was ‘sent to Coventry’ by Kenya’s
Justice Minister, a man responsible for delivering the passage of key
anti-terror legislation, for six months following the travel advisory crisis
(Clay  int.). Kenyan ofﬁcials have also bemoaned in private their
apparent ‘snubbing’ by donors in relation to Somalia (Whitaker :
) and security cooperation more generally (Nairobi cable ..).
By comparison, not only have Ugandan ofﬁcials been far more
 J O N A T H A N F I S H E R
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Oct 2014 IP address: 147.188.224.215
constructive in the face of donor security criticisms, they have
even readily identiﬁed in meetings with senior US diplomats ‘areas
where [they] need to improve [their] counter-terrorism efforts’
thereby revealing themselves to be conscientious and self-critical in
their approach to ﬁghting terrorism (Kampala cable ..).
Furthermore, while Ugandan ofﬁcials have publicly reprimanded
donors on security matters these comments have invariably been
couched in constructive language and supported by simultaneous offers
of assistance to donor personnel (Associated Press ..; former
senior US ofﬁcial . int.).
The implications of Kenya’s unexpected  incursion into Somalia
for its international image management are yet to become clear.
Certainly the initial public reaction of both Washington and Paris, whose
governments Nairobi claimed had assisted the mission, was one of
surprise and trepidation rather than commendation (New York Times
..). As noted, donors had not in fact been informed of the
mission by Nairobi in advance and US ofﬁcials have privately claimed
that this unpredictable Kenyan behaviour led to a ‘difﬁcult period’ in
US–Kenyan relations and a ‘robust discussion’ in the US capital on how
best to respond (US ofﬁcial  int.). Since the intervention, however,
the Kenyan government appears to have become more proactive in
shaping how its involvement in Somalia is understood internationally.
Thus, since September , Chlopak, Leonard, Schlechter and
Associates –Nairobi’s public relations ﬁrm in Washington since
 – has begun to engage with major international media houses
and policy institutes over their portrayal of the issue (Chlopak, Leonard,
Schlechter and Associates : –). Whether or not this is the start
of a new chapter in Kenya’s approach to international diplomacy,
however, remains to be seen –US ofﬁcials continue, as of mid-, to
express ‘frustration’ at the mixed messages reportedly coming out of the
Kenyan military on the issue (US ofﬁcial  int.).
Where the Ugandan government, therefore, has, since /, devoted
considerable resources to promoting itself as a cooperative ally in the
ﬁght against terrorism, Nairobi has seemingly made little effort to do the
same. Indeed, through a combination of incompetence, disinterest and
lack of initiative it has failed to convince donors to see it in the same
light, in spite of its substantial cooperation in the GWOT. Uganda’s
successful use of ‘image management’ strategies and Kenya’s unwilling-
ness or inability to employ similar tactics can therefore be seen as central
explanations for why donors have held such contrasting views of these
two governments and their reliability in the GWOT.
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Domestic politics and international image management:
the political economy of diplomacy in Uganda and Kenya
That Kenya has failed to portray itself effectively to donors as a reliable
partner in the GWOT is potentially a measure more of a successful image
management policy than an unsuccessful one. The Kenyan government
has long been nervous of the potential risk to its domestic reputation,
particularly among the Kenyan Muslim community, run by appearing
overly close to the US and other donors on counter-terrorism. Kenyan
Muslims have increasingly interpreted US regional security policy as
hostile to their community (Lind & Howell : –) and this has
clearly made senior ofﬁcials more wary of being publicly associated with
the GWOT agenda. Unlike in Uganda, for example, alienating such a
group could potentially imperil an administration’s continued tenure
given the competitive nature of Kenyan politics and the necessity of
building delicate coalitions of ethnic and regional constituencies to
maintain power. Muslims in Kenya’s Coast Province, for example, were
seen as key ‘swing voters’ by commentators in the lead-up to the 
elections (Daily Nation ..).
Donors have undoubtedly been conscious of the sensitivity of this
issue for their Kenyan counterparts. One former UK ofﬁcial notes that
Kenyan political engagement over security has been ‘ostrich-like’ owing
to the latter’s fear of ‘alienating Muslims’ (former UK ofﬁcial  int.).
The US envoy in Nairobi privately suggested in  that approaching
Kenya’s foreign minister directly over anti-terror legislation was not
advisable since ‘[if such an approach were leaked] . . . it would be
spun . . . as just another example of U.S. “arm-twisting”’ and that this
would be problematic for on-going US–Kenyan security cooperation
(Nairobi cable ..). US aid interventions in Kenya have also
increasingly focused on winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of Kenyan
Muslims (Bradbury & Kleinman ) and developing ‘community-
based’ responses to tackling extremism (senior US ofﬁcial  int.).
It might plausibly be argued, therefore, that the Kibaki government
has attempted to publicly present itself as a reluctant donor partner in
the GWOT for domestic political reasons and that donors appreciate
and understand this. Nairobi has nevertheless, under this proposed
dispensation, cooperated privately with donors on counter-terrorism
in order to satisfy its Western partners. Though intriguing, such an
interpretation is not ultimately persuasive for two reasons. First, as
outlined above, it is clear that donors have perceived Kenya as unreliable
in private, as well as in public, throughout the s in relation to
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counter-terrorism cooperation. This suggests that any active policy of
Nairobi’s to appear to be privately cooperating with donors while
maintaining a public appearance of distance failed to convince,
again raising questions about the administration’s image management
techniques. Second, the Kibaki government has been far less reluctant
to openly target Muslims in its domestic security policies during the
s than this interpretation permits. These policies, as one US ofﬁcial
records, have often been ‘heavy handed’ (senior US ofﬁcial  int.)
and have, as Prestholdt records, gradually fostered a ‘deep sense of
alienation’ among Kenyan Muslims who have consistently objected
to being scapegoated in proposed legislation and by police and
security forces on the ground (Prestholdt : –; Financial Times
..).
The signiﬁcance of political economy to this study, however, is
nevertheless worthy of further comment since it is a valuable tool for
explaining why Kampala and Nairobi have adopted such different
approaches to image management. It is clear, for example, that the
Kibaki government has felt more constrained than the Museveni regime
in fully aligning itself with international GWOT issues for fear of losing
support from domestic Muslim constituencies. As noted, Kenya is a far
more democratic state than Uganda and no single party has such an
institutionalised grip on national power in the former as the NRM does
in the latter. Consequently, Kenyan politicians have been reluctant to
alienate large electoral communities such as the Muslim population
in Coast Province for fear of endangering their hold on power.
Furthermore, the Muslim community is far more organised in Kenya
with regard to leadership and national presence than in Uganda
(Haynes : –).
Moreover, the Kenyan and Ugandan governments have very different
sociologies and this has impacted upon their capacity to promote and
augment international security narratives. The Museveni regime grew
out of a highly disciplined, militaristic and organised guerrilla move-
ment and has long maintained a substantial degree of internal
discipline, singularity of purpose and, above all, centralisation and
personalisation of authority around Museveni himself (Ngoga :
–). This has therefore led to the fostering of a strongly uniﬁed
Ugandan foreign policy-making machine and this has enabled Kampala
to ‘speak with one voice’ in its relations with donors. The Kibaki regime,
by contrast, has always been a shifting, delicate coalition of ‘non-
programmatic’ parties who draw their support from different ethnic or
regional constituencies (Mueller : ). Internal government
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discipline or cohesion has been difﬁcult to maintain within this
dispensation and policy-making has therefore involved far more
compromise than in neighbouring Uganda, as many donor ofﬁcials
have noted (former UK ofﬁcial  int.; Nairobi cable ··).
Designing and maintaining a uniﬁed and disciplined approach to
dealing with donors, therefore, has been far more complex, from an
institutional perspective, in Kenya than in Uganda, particularly since the
inauguration of the ‘Government of National Unity’ in .
Finally, Uganda, unlike Kenya, is dependent on international aid and
the Museveni regime has been heavily reliant on donor support
(particularly from the US and UK) to fund the national budget since
long before / (OECD various years). Kampala has therefore had far
greater incentive to be seen positively in Washington and London than
Nairobi and this may also explain why it has been so much more
enthusiastic in using image management strategies; necessity, as the
saying goes, ‘is the mother of invention’.
C O N C L U S I O N
This study has argued that, since /, donor countries have seen the
Ugandan government as a more consistently reliable ally in the GWOT
than the Kenyan government. In exploring the reasons for these
differing donor perceptions, the importance of considering African
‘image management’ strategies – how African governments present
themselves and their actions to donor ofﬁcials – has been argued for. It
is clear, for example, that Kampala has been far more interested in
managing how its donors see it than Nairobi and has also been more
adept at doing so. Through the savvy use of lobbyists, speeches and
encounters with donors, the Ugandan government has successfully cast
itself as a loyal donor ally in the GWOT. The Kenyan government,
however, has largely eschewed such strategies and been reluctant to try
to inﬂuence donor perceptions. This has meant that donors have been
more inclined to focus on obvious areas of Kenyan ‘non-cooperation’
when developing views of the Kibaki government. In viewing
these regimes differently, however, donors have come to treat them
differently. Thus while Uganda has often escaped censure for domestic
transgressions owing to its perceived reliability in the GWOT, Kenya
has not.
This raises crucial questions on the nature of African agency in the
international system and the extent to which seemingly weak states can
improve their standing in donor capitals. This relationship between
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African security dynamics, regional diplomacy and international
agency remains a crucial area for further study, particularly given
the increasingly close relationship developing between the security
institutions of donors and their African aid partners.
N O T E S
. A review of scholarly literature on ‘compliance’ can be found in Simmons (: –).
. Kenya has not been signiﬁcantly aid-dependent since the late s.
. Prior to  this publication was known as Patterns of Global Terrorism.
. This article assumes these leaked documents to be genuine although their formal provenance
has been neither conﬁrmed nor denied by the US government to date. Cables are referenced
according to which US embassy they originated from.
. See Fisher () for a more developed analysis of this strategy.
. Information on lobbyists hired by both governments during this period is available at www.
fara.gov.
. The relationship between African agency and ‘image management’ is explored in depth in
Fisher (forthcoming ).
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